The Khaki Cartel: Pakistan’s Military-Industrial Complex
Islamic Republic in Uniform
The recent Pahagam attack on 22nd April 2025 in Jammu & Kashmir and India’s retaliation strikes on Pakistani terror camps in Bahawalpur, Muridke (Lahore) and 7 other targets in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir has once again brought the focus back on Pakistani army. The Pakistani army is the chief patron and sponsor radical Islamic jihadists in the region. The Pakistani army has conveniently portrayed itself as a victim of terror while hiding the fact that even after America left in the 90s it has continued to use terror groups as strategic assets against India. It is time to unmask the Pakistani military’s gruesome dictatorial regime operating behind the veneer of an establishment democracy. The generals in Rawalpindi have hijacked the Pakistani state and deeply perpetuated a system since its independence turning this rogue state into an ‘International Migraine’. Let us know try and make sense of the same.
Pakistan’s military has always held a prominent role in national life, but over the decades, its role has expanded far beyond the barracks and battlefield. What began as a defensive institution tasked with protecting borders has morphed into a powerful economic and political behemoth. Today, Pakistan’s military is not only the custodian of its security it is also one of the country’s largest business conglomerates. Its shadow economy, often referred to as military industrial complex, includes interests in real estate, banking, agriculture, construction, energy, and media. This military-led enterprise is not funded through the national defence budget, nor is it audited or subjected to civilian scrutiny. It operates behind a veil of Islamic radicalism, shielded from democratic accountability.
The military’s economic might is exercised through several major foundations and subsidiary companies. These include the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation, and Bahria Foundation each managing a web of commercial ventures under the pretext of soldier welfare. While these entities are ostensibly created for the benefit of retired personnel, in practice, they serve the economic interests of the military elite, particularly senior officers. Junior ranks and enlisted soldiers receive marginal benefits, while the top brass enjoy multiple land allotments, tax-exempt privileges, and control over profit-making enterprises.
This parallel economy has serious implications for Pakistan’s democracy and its long-term economic growth. The military's economic activities are immune to parliamentary oversight. Its commercial holdings enjoy tax exemptions and preferential access to government contracts. Land is acquired at throwaway prices and flipped at market rates through military-run housing societies like the Defence Housing Authority (DHA). Civilian businesses cannot compete on equal footing with an institution that not only controls the market but also the rules that govern it. Moreover, the military's control over the narrative through its influence in media ensures that public debate on its economic role remains muted. Journalists and analysts who attempt to expose this system face intimidation or censorship. Political leaders who try to assert civilian supremacy over military finances often find their tenures cut short or their governments destabilized.
This not a uniquely Pakistani phenomenon other militaries in the developing world, including those in Egypt, Indonesia, and Myanmar, have dabbled in commercial ventures. However, the scale and impunity with which Pakistan’s military operates its economy is unparalleled in South Asia. It is a republic within a republic: self-financing, self-governing, and immune to civilian intervention. This article traces the historical development of Pakistan’s military economy, unpacks its structure and operations, and assesses the cost it imposes on democracy, economic equity, its empire of drugs and terrorism. Understanding the anatomy of this khaki cartel is essential to understanding Pakistani Army’s military industrial complex.
1. Historical Foundations of Pakistan’s military Industrial Complex
The origins of Pakistan’s military economy trace back to the earliest years of independence. At first, military privileges appeared in the form of pensions, subsidized housing, and small-scale welfare initiatives designed to support ex-servicemen. However, these modest benefits quickly evolved into the foundation of an expansive commercial network. In 1954, the creation of the Fauji Foundation marked a significant turning point. It was ostensibly established to manage post-war funds received from Britain and channel them toward retired soldiers' welfare. However, the foundation quickly moved beyond social support into profit-driven industries.
The Fauji Foundation’s earliest ventures included cereal production, textiles, and sugar mills, later expanding into pharmaceuticals and fertilizers. The most prominent of these was the Fauji Fertilizer Company, which would grow to become Pakistan’s leading fertilizer producer. These businesses, though framed as welfare initiatives, operated as commercial entities generating substantial profits that were reinvested into the military ecosystem. Importantly, they functioned outside the purview of the civilian economy, avoiding many of the taxes and regulations imposed on private companies.
The 1960s saw the rise of General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military dictator, whose rule further expanded the economic privileges of the armed forces. Ayub’s government formalized the military’s integration into the economic elite. Under his policies, large tracts of agricultural land were granted to serving and retired officers. These weren’t symbolic gestures officers were awarded entire villages in Punjab and Sindh, often prime land made fertile by canal irrigation built using public funds. In many cases, entire communities were displaced in the name of “strategic agricultural development.”
Ayub’s industrial policies also played a pivotal role. Through the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), the state funded and nurtured numerous industrial projects with public money. Once these industries became viable, they were sold at subsidized rates to private parties, many of whom were military-linked individuals or families close to the regime. This practice embedded the military in the country’s nascent capitalist class and laid the groundwork for the close military-business partnerships that persist to this day.
During this period, cantonments also began to emerge as centres of privilege. Officers were allotted urban plots in newly developed areas within military zones, which later evolved into high-value real estate hubs. These allocations formed the basis for future Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs), which would eventually dominate Pakistan’s urban real estate market. By the end of the 1960s, Pakistan’s armed forces were not merely security force but also active players in the commercial and agricultural sectors. The military’s corporate interests had become institutionalized, operating with impunity and profiting handsomely under state patronage. These early developments created a template that would be emulated, scaled, and fiercely protected in the decades to follow.
2. Zia-ul-Haq Era and Deepening Economic Power
The era of General Zia-ul-Haq, spanning from 1977 to 1988, was pivotal in transforming Pakistan’s military economy from a peripheral institution into a dominant economic force. Zia’s martial law regime not only deepened the political role of the armed forces but also significantly expanded their economic influence. Under the guise of self-reliance and welfare, the military entrenched itself into the most lucrative sectors of the economy. What had begun as a welfare model in the 1950s was now rapidly evolving into a militarized capitalist enterprise.
Two major military-run foundations were launched during this time the Shaheen Foundation for the Pakistan Air Force and the Bahria Foundation for the Pakistan Navy. These mirrored the structure of the earlier Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and Fauji Foundation, and were tasked with creating independent commercial empires for their respective service branches. Their economic portfolios quickly expanded into aviation, shipping, banking, education, transport, insurance, and telecommunications.
The Shaheen Foundation, for instance, would go on to operate the country’s first private airline Shaheen Air International and own stakes in travel agencies, freight forwarding companies, and pilot training academies. Similarly, the Bahria Foundation established shipping companies and diving schools, while venturing into property development and technical institutes. These commercial operations were formally presented as welfare ventures but operated for profit and received preferential treatment from the state.
Meanwhile, organizations like the National Logistics Cell (NLC) and Frontier Works Organization (FWO), originally formed for strategic and crisis operations, expanded their commercial activities. The NLC began hauling both public and private freight across the country, effectively becoming the largest logistics company in Pakistan. With preferential access to fuel, tax exemptions, and direct orders from government ministries, the NLC undercut and displaced civilian transport companies. Similarly, the FWO took charge of national infrastructure projects, building roads, bridges, and tunnels, including high-profile ventures like the Karakoram Highway. While these projects showcased engineering capability, they also cemented FWO's role as a state-backed commercial contractor. Bids were rarely opened to the public; the military was awarded contracts based on the belief that it would deliver with unmatched efficiency.
Another key development during the Zia era was the proliferation of military housing schemes. Entire neighbourhood’s in cities like Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad were constructed for military officers, often on land acquired from civilian authorities at nominal rates. These eventually evolved into Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs) real estate powerhouses offering luxury residential living, high-end shopping plazas, and state-of-the-art facilities, all backed by the military’s logistical and legal muscle.
The military’s encroachment into civilian economic space went largely unchallenged during Zia’s rule. The political opposition was weakened, courts were compliant, and the media was tightly controlled. As a result, this period laid the institutional, legal, and psychological foundation for what would later become an unaccountable economic empire. By the late 1980s, the military was not only dominating state policy but had also embedded itself deeply into Pakistan’s capitalist class. The transformation from welfare to wealth accumulation was now complete and irreversible.
3. Musharraf Era and Institutionalized Expansion
The military economy in Pakistan reached its most expansive and institutionalized phase during the rule of General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008). Coming to power through a coup, Musharraf presided over an era where the armed forces not only governed Pakistan but also embedded themselves into nearly every profitable sector of the economy. While earlier military regimes had fostered the growth of military commercial ventures, Musharraf’s tenure formalized and elevated Military industrial complex into a state within a state self-sustaining, protected, and aggressively expanding.
Over 1,200 serving and retired military officers were appointed to senior civilian positions during this period. These included chairmanships and executive posts in state-owned enterprises like WAPDA, Pakistan Railways, PTV, OGDCL, and the Civil Aviation Authority. In several cases, these officials lacked relevant civilian expertise, but their presence ensured institutional compliance with the military’s economic goals. Many ministries functioned in parallel with GHQ Rawalpindi’s informal economic directives.
The Fauji Foundation, the military’s flagship commercial group, expanded rapidly under Musharraf’s regime. It controlled over 20 subsidiaries, including Pakistan’s largest fertilizer companies, cereal manufacturers, a cement enterprise, and a major power generation firm. The Fauji Fertilizer Company, for example, became one of the country’s most profitable entities regularly posting billion-rupee annual profits and enjoying market dominance with minimal competition due to regulatory insulation.
The Army Welfare Trust (AWT) similarly grew in scope. It operated the Askari Group, comprising Askari Bank, Askari Cement, Askari Leasing, and Askari Insurance. These institutions serviced not only the military ecosystem but also began to capture public market share. The AWT’s footprint expanded to include industrial units, trucking services, and commercial agriculture. Despite operating in core sectors of the economy, these entities continued to claim “welfare” status and remained shielded from normal taxation and competition law.
The real estate sector witnessed even more dramatic growth. Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs), previously limited to a few cities, expanded into new territories including Multan, Bahawalpur, Gujranwala, and Peshawar. Large tracts of public and forest land were transferred to DHA through official notifications, often displacing marginalized communities. These plots were then sold at commercial rates, earning windfall profits for military administrators and retired officers who had early access to the allotments.
Musharraf’s close alliance with the United States after 9/11 resulted in billions of dollars in military and development aid. Much of this funding was channelled through military institutions with little oversight. Equipment procurement, supply chain management, and logistics contracts were awarded to military-run firms such as NLC and FWO. The boundaries between national security operations and commercial activity blurred, with vast sums diverted into land acquisition, construction projects, and financial instruments managed by military-linked banks.
Meanwhile, media influence was used to build a favourable narrative around the military’s role in “nation-building.” Retired generals and brigadiers were given control over TV channels, think tanks, and publishing houses. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) expanded its media footprint, producing films, documentaries, and even pop culture programming to craft a heroic image of the armed forces. By the end of Musharraf’s rule, the military had evolved into a comprehensive corporate machine. It controlled assets worth billions of dollars, occupied key decision-making roles across civilian institutions, and enjoyed political legitimacy rooted in narratives of discipline, development, and security. The commercialization of the military was no longer an informal reality it had become an official part of Pakistan’s economic order.
4. Structure and Mechanisms of the Military Economy
Pakistan’s military economy is not a disorganized cluster of business ventures it is a highly structured, layered, and institutionalized system. It operates under a cohesive command structure, managed through interconnected foundations, subsidiary companies, and operational units, all protected by law and bolstered by informal power. This structure has evolved over decades to maximize financial autonomy, legal insulation, and institutional control.
At the foundational level, four principal military-run trusts serve as the nerve centres of military industrial complex: the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation, and Bahria Foundation. Each represents a different branch of the armed forces Army, Air Force, and Navy. These organizations claim to provide welfare services, but in reality, they operate as holding companies managing multi-billion-rupee portfolios. They function under charitable or social welfare registration acts, allowing them to legally bypass many corporate and labour regulations that govern private firms.
Beneath these foundations lies a web of subsidiary companies, exceeding 100 in number, spanning virtually every sector of Pakistan’s economy. These include cement manufacturing, fertilizer production, insurance, banking, food processing, education, real estate, aviation, security services, logistics, and health care. Examples include Fauji Cement, Fauji Cereals, Fauji Kabirwala Power Company, Askari Insurance, and Askari Bank. These subsidiaries are staffed and managed largely by retired officers and benefit from continued links to the military’s logistical and political infrastructure.
The military also operates operational support units, such as the National Logistics Cell (NLC) and the Frontier Works Organization (FWO). These institutions began as strategic infrastructure and crisis management units but have since evolved into full-service commercial contractors. NLC manages cargo freight, warehousing, and customs clearance, while FWO dominates public infrastructure construction, including dams, highways, tunnels, and bridges. Both receive state funding and are often granted no-bid contracts for government projects. Their commercial earnings are not publicly disclosed, yet they operate under the protective umbrella of national security.
A crucial component of the military economy is its grip on real estate and urban planning. Through the Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs) and Army Welfare Housing Schemes, the military controls vast tracts of urban land across all major cities. These authorities handle zoning, utilities, and even local law enforcement within their jurisdictions. Land is acquired through executive orders or transferred from civilian departments, often displacing informal settlers or encroaching on state land. Once acquired, the land is sold to civilians or officers at exorbitant rates, generating windfall profits.
The system is also sustained by individual perks and entitlements. Serving and retiring officers are routinely awarded residential and agricultural land, often multiple plots across different cities. They also receive subsidized vehicles, duty-free imports, educational scholarships for their children, and medical care in exclusive military hospitals. These privileges reinforce loyalty within the ranks and ensure that the military elite remains economically insulated from the general population.
What makes this structure particularly robust is its self-reinforcing nature. Generals and colonels who serve in command roles are later absorbed into the commercial ecosystem they once helped expand. They are appointed as CEOs, board directors, and trustees within military-run enterprises. This seamless transition between service and business solidifies a corporate-military class that blurs the line between national service and private gain.
Because these organizations are officially categorized as welfare initiatives or strategic units, they are exempt from tax audits, labour inspections, and parliamentary oversight. They also rarely appear in national economic statistics. As a result, a substantial portion of Pakistan’s economy remains hidden from public view, concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable institution.
5. Economic and Political Consequences
The entrenchment of the military in Pakistan’s economy has led to a profound reshaping of the country’s economic and political landscape. While military officials frequently justify their business ventures on the grounds of efficiency, discipline, and welfare, the actual consequences tell a different story one of economic distortion, elite capture, and erosion of democratic institutions. From an economic perspective, the military’s presence creates a fundamentally uneven playing field. Its businesses benefit from significant privileges that are unavailable to civilian firms. These include tax exemptions, import duty waivers, free access to land, guaranteed government contracts, and exemptions from labour laws. Such advantages not only crowd out private enterprises but also discourage innovation and entrepreneurship. In sectors such as logistics, fertilizer, insurance, and real estate, the dominance of military-run firms effectively shuts the door to new competitors.
For example, Askari Insurance and Askari Bank offer services to government departments and military personnel, often under preferred agreements. Their costs are artificially lowered due to access to military infrastructure and tax incentives. Similarly, NLC’s trucking fleet receives subsidized diesel and maintenance through military workshops, while private hauliers pay full commercial rates. The Fauji Fertilizer Company, backed by state procurement contracts, holds a monopolistic position in the agricultural sector.
The real estate market faces some of the most visible distortions. In cities like Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi, Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs) control large swaths of high-value urban land. Property values in DHA often exceed neighbouring areas by 200–400%, not because of superior urban planning alone but due to the exclusive legal and administrative privileges these housing schemes enjoy. Water, electricity, security, and sewage systems in DHA zones are prioritized over civilian neighbourhood’s, creating a dual-tiered urban infrastructure based on military affiliation.
Politically, the military’s economic strength translates directly into institutional dominance. Parliament lacks the authority to audit or regulate military commercial ventures. Attempts by elected governments to bring these ventures under regulatory purview have consistently been resisted, often resulting in political backlash or the undermining of civilian administrations. High-profile civilian leaders who have dared to challenge military economic interests such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif have seen their tenures cut short, often under dubious or abrupt circumstances.
The media, which could have served as a watchdog, is also compromised. Military influence extends into journalism through both ownership and intimidation. Several television channels, newspapers, and digital media platforms are either owned by ex-officers or heavily reliant on military-linked advertising. Journalists investigating land scandals, procurement deals, or business practices involving the military face harassment, abduction, or character assassination. This unchecked economic empire also leads to policy distortion. The military, being a stakeholder in sectors ranging from energy to transportation, often influences state decisions that would ideally fall under the purview of civilian ministries. For instance, procurement priorities are adjusted to favour military logistics firms, or infrastructure plans are modified to align with DHA expansions.
More dangerously, the military’s vested economic interests can act as an impediment to peace and regional cooperation. The maintenance of a heightened security posture justifies the continuation of high defence budgets and indirectly supports Military Industrial Complex. A peaceful neighbourhoods may not serve the economic model of an institution that profits from conflict readiness. In sum, the military’s economic empire comes at a high cost: it damages civilian enterprise, disfigures public policy, marginalizes elected institutions, and perpetuates a culture of impunity. The longer this imbalance continues, the harder it becomes to reclaim economic sovereignty and democratic governance.
6. Drugs, Arms, and Illicit Trade: The Military’s Invisible Economy
The underbelly of Pakistan’s military dominance includes not just overt business ventures, but covert financial flows generated through drugs, arms, and illicit trade. These shadow operations though consistently denied by the state have repeatedly surfaced in global narcotics reports, counterterrorism dossiers, and declassified intelligence assessments. Together, they reveal a disturbing nexus involving elements within the military and intelligence services facilitating or protecting illegal trafficking to finance proxy operations and maintain off-the-books revenue.
Narcotics trafficking remains the most pervasive channel. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan produced over 6,200 tons of opium in 2022, accounting for more than 85% of the world’s supply. Nearly 40% of this drug output is believed to pass through Pakistan via Balochistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region before reaching global markets in Iran, the Middle East, and Europe. The Makran Coastline in Balochistan has emerged as a key narcotics export route, despite heavy security presence by the Pakistani military and Navy.
Reports by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs have highlighted the lack of oversight and prosecution in Pakistan’s drug corridors. In 2020 alone, Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) seized over 400 metric tons of narcotics an enormous figure, yet widely seen as the tip of the iceberg. Smugglers operating near Gwadar and Pasni in Balochistan have long been reported to have “protection arrangements” with elements of the Frontier Corps (FC) or other paramilitary units.
Financially, the drug trade through Pakistan is estimated at over $2 billion annually, with a portion suspected to fund intelligence-led proxy warfare in Jammu & Kashmir and Afghanistan. This model was entrenched during the 1980s, when the ISI with CIA assistance channelled heroin profits to finance mujahideen in Afghanistan. According to a 1993 report by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, this policy was sustained well into the 1990s, creating a self-funding covert network.
Parallel to narcotics is arms smuggling, where Pakistani soil serves both as a route and a source. The Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) at Wah Cantonment, meant for domestic defence production, has long faced allegations of leakage to non-state actors. Numerous reports have linked POF-made rifles, grenades, and mortars to militant caches recovered in Jammu & Kashmir and Afghanistan. In 2021, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs confirmed seizures of Pakistani-manufactured weapons used by terror groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Moreover, surplus arms captured from NATO forces in Afghanistan have reportedly been sold on the black market, often with tacit military knowledge. A 2018 report by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) identified Pakistani military-grade equipment including night vision devices, radio sets, and explosives in the hands of the Taliban and Haqqani Network. Such materials are not easily available without systemic facilitation.
This blend of narco-financing and illicit arms trade forms the financial spine of Pakistan’s proxy warfare. It enables operations to continue even during diplomatic isolation or funding restrictions. These networks are highly compartmentalized and often insulated from accountability through a web of military courts, intelligence secrecy laws, and protected command structures. Until these black economies are dismantled, any discussion of civilian supremacy or counter-terrorism in Pakistan will remain hollow.
7. Terrorist Networks and Strategic Assets: The Military’s Unofficial Foreign Policy Tools
One of the most controversial and globally condemned dimensions of the Pakistan Army’s operations is its strategic use of terrorist organizations as foreign policy instruments. Far from being rogue elements or isolated actors, many of these militant outfits operate as semi-official proxies of the military and its intelligence wing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Through ideological grooming, logistical support, arms supply, and safe havens, these groups serve the dual purpose of bleeding adversaries like India and exerting control in Afghanistan, all while maintaining a veneer of plausible deniability.
The origins of this policy trace back to the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, when Pakistan backed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia channelled funds and arms to the mujahideen via the ISI. This infrastructure did not dissolve with the war's end; instead, it evolved. The ISI retained control over the militant pipeline, now redirected towards Jammu & Kashmir and post-Soviet Afghanistan. According to a 2011 Brookings Institution report, the ISI continued to view these groups as “strategic assets” necessary for maintaining influence without formal engagement.
Key groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Haqqani Network have long been considered ISI proxies. LeT, for instance, orchestrated the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that killed 166 people, including foreign nationals. Investigations by both India’s NIA and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed direct coordination with ISI handlers and military officials. Despite global outcry and UN Security Council designations, LeT continues to operate under various charitable aliases like Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), with its leader Hafiz Saeed frequently seen under token house arrest, only to be released quietly later.
The Haqqani Network, responsible for some of the most brutal attacks on NATO and Afghan forces, has maintained command centres and training facilities within Pakistan, especially in North Waziristan. The U.S. Department of Defence, in its 2018 report to Congress, identified the ISI’s continued support to the Haqqanis as a critical barrier to Afghan peace. In 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the Haqqani Network “a veritable arm of the ISI.”
Another long-standing beneficiary is Jaish-e-Mohammed, founded by Masood Azhar after being released in the 1999 IC-814 hijacking. JeM claimed responsibility for the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, which killed over 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. Despite international designations and sanctions, Azhar has not only remained at large in Pakistan but has also allegedly received state protection. Domestically, these militant outfits have been used to suppress dissent, target political opponents, and spread religious radicalism. Sectarian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have reportedly received operational freedom in return for supporting military agendas in restive regions like Balochistan. These groups are used to stoke Sunni extremism to counter Baloch nationalism and to eliminate Shia political figures under the radar of official accountability.
The Pakistan Army and ISI, indirectly owes an allegiance to global Islamist movement, have consistently used Muslim Brotherhood-style networks as ideological and operational allies. This is particularly visible in their support for groups like Hamas, which is officially an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. While Pakistan does not formally recognize Israel and has no diplomatic relations, it has maintained low-level contacts with Hamas through ideological partners and intelligence channels. The two share common ground in their anti-Israel posture, support for Islamic resistance, and deep distrust of Western liberalism.
The Turkish-Pakistani alignment, especially under Erdoğan’s AKP government, has further cemented these ties. Erdoğan, who sees himself as a revivalist of the Ottoman-Islamic leadership role in the Muslim world, has openly embraced Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and offered sanctuary to its exiled members after the 2013 Sisi coup in Egypt. Pakistan, in return, has aligned rhetorically and diplomatically with Erdoğan, especially on issues like Jammu & Kashmir and Palestine. Both countries oppose secular Arab regimes allied with the West and have supported a narrative of Islamic unity against imperialism, Zionism, and “Western cultural invasion.”
The military dimension of this relationship cannot be ignored. Turkey and Pakistan have signed multiple defence cooperation agreements, joint training programs, and naval coordination deals. Turkish drones and surveillance technology have reportedly been shared with Pakistan, while both nations conduct joint naval exercises. Turkey has also supported Pakistan diplomatically at the UN and OIC on Jammu & Kashmir, while Pakistan defends Erdoğan’s Islamic leadership role in forums traditionally dominated by Gulf monarchies. Hamas, meanwhile, has reportedly used Pakistani passports and training networks via ISI-linked groups in the past. Though these ties are denied, credible intelligence from Israeli and Western agencies has flagged indirect Pakistani support to Hamas through Malaysia, Turkey, and Qatar-based channels. Together, Pakistan, Turkey, and Brotherhood-aligned entities like Hamas represent a new transnational Islamist axis not always visible in official policy but potent in ideological influence, covert coordination, and symbolic resistance to the secular-global order. This axis challenges not only Western hegemony but also threatens moderate Muslim voices, promoting a new form of geopolitical Islamism fueled by covert alliances and deep ideological conviction.
Despite global pressure including FATF grey-listing and UN Security Council warnings Pakistan’s deep state has resisted dismantling these groups, often rebranding them under new names or diverting international aid toward cosmetic crackdowns. This duality of cracking down on “bad” terrorists while protecting “strategic assets” has created a parallel security architecture that undermines both regional peace and internal stability. Unless these networks are dismantled from their roots within the military-intelligence nexus, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism posture will remain duplicitous. The price is paid not only by neighbouring countries like India who have suffered at hands of Pakistan’s proxy war for decades now.
8. Human Trafficking and Organ Trade: The Silent Economy of Exploitation
While drug and arms trafficking dominate headlines, an equally sinister and underreported element of Pakistan's shadow economy is the rise of human trafficking and illegal organ trade. Though these activities are officially prosecuted by civilian agencies, the reality on the ground particularly in border provinces and conflict zones suggests that systemic criminality thrives under the military’s blind eye or protection. In many cases, victims are drawn from vulnerable communities in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh’s interior, and Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir regions marked by poverty, conflict, and military overreach.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Global Slavery Index 2023, Pakistan ranks among the top 10 countries for modern slavery, with an estimated 3.2 million people subjected to forced labour, sexual trafficking, bonded servitude, and organ theft. Many victims are recruited through fake job offers or abducted during counterinsurgency operations in militarized zones. Reports from Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) have highlighted enforced disappearances particularly of Baloch and Pashtun youth some of whom are never traced, while others surface months later in remote detention centres or morgues.
In several high-profile cases, missing persons have been found with vital organs surgically removed, fuelling suspicions of organ trafficking. Black-market kidney transplants have become a booming industry in Pakistan. A 2017 report by Interpol and WHO identified Pakistan as one of the world’s top illegal organ transplant destinations, with an underground industry worth over $100 million annually. Patients, often from the Gulf or East Asia, are charged exorbitant fees, while donors many abducted, coerced, or misled receive meagre sums or nothing at all.
Military hospitals, due to their secrecy and immunity from civilian oversight, have come under suspicion. Whistleblower testimonies, including former paramedics and investigative journalists, have hinted that military-run facilities in Punjab and Rawalpindi may have been used for clandestine transplant operations. These facilities are protected from surprise inspections, and internal audits are rarely made public. While direct involvement by the top brass is unproven, the failure to investigate recurring allegations indicates institutional protection or at least complicity through inaction.
In border areas such as Gwadar, Taftan, and Chaman, human trafficking networks are deeply entrenched. Victims especially women and children are smuggled across the Iranian or Afghan borders into Gulf states or used locally for sex trafficking. These routes are heavily militarized, patrolled by the Frontier Corps and army checkpoints. Yet traffickers operate with impunity, suggesting tacit arrangements with security personnel. Multiple survivors have testified that they were moved through military-escorted convoys or held in facilities near cantonment zones.
The problem is exacerbated by the lack of legal accountability. Military courts do not entertain such cases unless directed by the army chief, while civilian courts often face pressure, intimidation, or lack jurisdiction over military facilities. This has created a legal vacuum where crimes of enormous magnitude are either underreported or silenced entirely. Until Pakistan establishes independent oversight over military zones and dismantles legal immunities, the trafficking and organ trade will continue to thrive silently enriching rogue elements while eroding the country’s moral and human foundations.
The State Within the State
The Pakistan Army has evolved into far more than a national security force. It has become the state’s most powerful economic actor, covert intelligence coordinator, and arbiter of national policy operating with near-complete autonomy and minimal oversight. Its reach extends from fertilizer plants and housing colonies to the dark corridors of drug smuggling, arms trade, and even human trafficking. What emerges is a portrait not of a professional defence institution, but of a parallel power structure one that exists above the constitution, immune to audit, and answerable only to itself.
The sheer scale of this military-commercial empire spanning real estate, agriculture, logistics, pharmaceuticals, and defence production has created a dual economy. In this ecosystem, military-run enterprises enjoy tax exemptions, preferential treatment, and opaque financing, while civilian industries languish under heavy regulation, corruption, and policy neglect. This imbalance suppresses entrepreneurship, discourages foreign investment, and stifles innovation leaving Pakistan’s economic future hostage to a security apparatus that behaves more like a feudal oligarchy than a state institution.
What makes this structure even more dangerous is its insulation from civilian accountability. Parliament has no authority to audit military foundations. The media is muzzled through intimidation, forced disappearances, and legal threats. The judiciary, either through coercion or complicity, rarely dares to confront the military’s economic activities. This has created a culture of impunity where even the gravest allegations like drug financing of jihadist networks or black-market organ transplants are either dismissed as conspiracies or buried under layers of legal immunity and institutional silence.
Internationally, the Pakistan Army has leveraged its geopolitical importance to extract aid, military assistance, and diplomatic cover from both the West and the East. The United States, China, and Gulf monarchies have all, at different times, propped up the army’s dominance in return for regional leverage, counter-terrorism cooperation, or military manpower. This external validation further emboldens the military leadership to act without constraint internally, knowing that international pressure will be diluted by strategic interests.
The nexus between Pakistan’s military establishment and radical Islamist networks has long been a feature of its covert power structure, and under the leadership of General Asim Munir, this dynamic has entered a more ideologically rigid phase. A former ISI chief known for his close ties to conservative clerical factions, General Munir has reportedly strengthened the alliance between the military and hardline religious groups, including Deobandi and Salafi seminaries linked to proscribed outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Unlike his predecessors who maintained a more pragmatic balance between militancy and diplomacy, Munir is seen as ideologically aligned with Islamist narratives, openly invoking Quranic and Hadith-based references in public speeches and promoting a “guardianship of faith” doctrine within the army. Intelligence reports suggest renewed engagement between the army and clerics in Punjab and KP provinces, reviving the doctrine of jihad as strategic depth. Moreover, under Munir, the military’s links with regional Islamist movements such as Hamas, through the Brotherhood-aligned Turkish and Qatari channels have intensified, forming a “General-Mullah” nexus that blurs the lines between statecraft and theocratic militarism.
Yet the cost of this unchecked militarism is being paid by not only Pakistan but also countries in the region like India, Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia and it will not be surprising to see China also suffer the onslaught of this Mullah-Military nexus in Pakistan under General Asim Munir. Ethnic minorities in Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are systematically disenfranchised, brutalized under counterinsurgency pretexts, and often exploited for economic gain. Civil society is gasping under the weight of surveillance, censorship, and fear. Even the military’s internal logic is increasingly short-sighted invested more in preserving economic dominance than in addressing existential threats like climate change, energy insecurity, or systemic economic collapse.
In short Pakistan is now governed by thee 3Ms i.e. Mullah, Military & Money. Pakistan cannot move toward real democracy, equitable development, or regional peace without confronting the military’s overreach. This requires international resolve, and institutional reforms that bring the army under constitutional control not just in theory, but in tangible economic and legal terms. It is time international community specially IMF, World Bank, America and the world at large stop supporting this genocidal military regime in Pakistan which seeks annihilation of not only its minorities but even Hindus in India. Until then, Pakistan will remain a nation governed not by its parliament or its people, but by generals whose interests lie not in service but in power, profit, and perpetual conflict putting the region and the world in peril.