Introduction: The Rise of Psy-War in the 21st Century
In the 21st century, war has transcended traditional battlefields. The new frontlines are psychological, digital, and informational. Cyberspace has emerged as the ultimate terrain where power is projected not just through missiles and soldiers but through narratives, algorithms, and ideological influence. The most strategic weapon of this new era is propaganda aimed not just at the enemy’s military but at its citizens' perceptions, morale, and understanding of truth. China, with its deeply rooted ideological apparatus, has taken this psychological warfare to new heights. The Doklam standoff with India in 2017 and the 2025 TikTok campaign against the United States are two powerful bookends in a growing doctrine of state-sponsored perception management.
Psychological warfare (Psy-War) as a Chinese tool is not new, but in the age of social media and artificial intelligence, its reach, sophistication, and danger have exponentially grown. From the battlefields of the Himalayas to the smartphones of American teenagers, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has refined an intricate system of internal indoctrination and external influence. At the heart of this machine is a tightly controlled propaganda infrastructure that dates back to Mao’s campaigns in Yan’an but now fuses Leninist ideology with Silicon Valley’s algorithms.
The Ideological Blueprint: From Mao to Xi
It is thus essential to understand how Propaganda machinery in China works and how it has evolved with time into a very potent disinformation campaign taking the core values from Soviet Era propaganda techniques. Chairman Mao drew on the experiences of the imperialists and nationalists regimes across the world like Nazis or the Soviet Union to formulate a propaganda machine and control the flow of information across the China. The Chinese Communist propaganda system represented Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination and mass mobilization which is also known as Agitprop in Soviet terminology. The CPC system of propaganda had its origins in Yan’an and the movements carried out there by Mao in an effort to transform the Chinese society after 1949 revolution. Mao used various techniques to control the flow of information and people’s way of thought which included mass mobilization campaigns, creation of study groups and ideological monitors in society, incarcerating people for brainwashing, documents, control of education system, control content of newspapers and editorials, controlling media broadcasts and nationwide loudspeaker system. These propaganda techniques were embodied in terms like ‘xuanchuan dui’ to indoctrinate specific segments of the population.
The Propaganda system in current era in China is similar to that of the Church in Medieval Europe where Propaganda is considered spiritual work and Chinese propagandists like priests guide their flocks. In aftermath of Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, Jiang Zemin set out a new propaganda policy which is being followed to present day. Jiang’s doctrine of propaganda was ‘Seize with both hands, both hands must be strong’ (liang shou zhua, liang shou dou yao ying), reemphasizing that the CCP should focus on twin strategy of economic growth and a rigorous propaganda and spreading political thought across China. The CCP’s propaganda department is known as Zhong Xuan Bu in Chinese or the Central Publicity Department in English and is the real nerve center of the entire system. CCP’s propaganda is divided into two categories i.e. Internal (duinei) which is directed towards Chinese people and External (duiwai) which is directed towards foreigners and the outside world.
The kind of propaganda that this department disseminates can be broadly classified into 4 categories i.e. political, economic, cultural and social propaganda. The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) of CCP oversees Internal Propaganda while its brother organization Office of Foreign Propaganda (OFP) oversees the department of External Propaganda. Both the CPD & OFP are supervised and controlled by a small leading group made up of bureaucracy and leaders belonging to the Communist Party of China and are closely interlinked. As per China’s Statistical Yearbook 2004, the Central Propaganda Department or Publicity Department has supervisory control over 2,262 Tv Stations, 2119 Newspapers, 9074 periodicals and 1123 publishing houses, 68 million Internet accounts with 100 million users and 300 million mobile phone users.
Internal vs External Propaganda: Two Faces of the Dragon
The Central Propaganda Department of CCP is meant to have guiding role and not implementing the policing and censoring public space in China which is generally tasked to state run organizations like State Bureau of Publishing, The Public Security Bureau, The Ministry of Culture, Party and non-party newspapers, television and so on. The foreign propaganda wing or the Office of Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office as it is known unlike CPD guides and implements Foreign Propaganda dissemination. The Foreign propaganda wing researches and develops China’s foreign publicity material activities while monitoring, policing and censoring all such activities in China which may come under ambit of foreign propaganda like activities of foreign journalists, monitoring foreign social science research on China, and controlling the Internet. The MII (Xinxi Chanye Bu) was created as part of State Council Organizational reform plan of 1998 which assimilated several ministries & departments inside it and was tasked to manage technical aspect of electronic communications in China as in hardware’s in propaganda system and telecom networks. In parallel to MII, there is GAPP (General Administration of Press & Publication) (Guojia Xinwen Chubanshu or Guojia Chuban Ju) which deals with publishing industry as in copyright infringements, regulating ISBNs piracy and audio visual guidelines for other ministries like ministry of culture.
In addition to domestic propaganda machinery under CPD, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has its own propaganda system with two levels, (1) General Political Department (GPD) and (2) Party Committee (dangwei), Party Branch (dang zhibu) & Party Small Group (dang xiazou). While the later primarily deals with party members inside the PLA, GPD deals with propaganda work for all members of PLA. GPD’s role has been to indoctrinate the rank & file of the PLA and seek obedience of the military institutions to the party. GPD also deals with officer’s management, welfare of carders, military courts & some intelligence functions. The GPD in this context manages the education, publication, literature, film, television & arts tightly controlling the information which is used for consumption of the PLA carders.
Domestically China’s biggest state news agency Xinhua is another part of the propaganda wing of CCP which has been the organ of the State council. Xinhua plays a dual role of reporting news and to disseminate the party propaganda. Xinhua just like any other communist state run organization runs two set of news service one that is for general public that is influenced by propaganda and censorship and another one for the party officials which is uncensored. CCP through its domestic propaganda arms as we have seen above indoctrinates and brainwashes its public and military of controlled and censored information while the Party officials at the top are well connected with world developments.
The External propaganda arm of CCP i.e. Office of Foreign Propaganda covers wide variety of media including Radio Beijing, People’s Broadcasting System Taiwan and Hong Kong services, CCTV broadcasting to Taiwan of Cross-Strait Voice (Haixia zhisheng), publications such as People’s Daily foreign edition (haiwai ban), China Today, Beijing Review, People’s China, China Pictorial, China Daily, Voice of China, Liaowang weekly edition and various other publications of the Foreign Languages Press. Xinhua’s international department also comes under the purview of external propaganda department. Though the hawkish Global Times unlike People’s Daily is not connected with Party or the PLA directly yet Global Times chief editor Hu Xijin has unabashed admitted to be telling about the party view in blunt language which is masked in diplomatic language in the People Daily. The control of the CCP is so tight on propaganda and information dissemination that all editorials of major dailies like People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, China Youth Daily, Workers Daily, Xinhua News Service are formally vetted and cleared by the CPD prior to publication and in some cases they are drafted by CPD for publication.
The United Front Works Department: A Global Outreach Weapon
External propaganda in China is also done through another agency “United Front Works Department” which has exchange programs with Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry), China Association for International Understanding (CCP International Department), China Association for International Friendly Contact (PLA General Political Department), China Institute of International Strategic Studies (PLA General Staff Department Second Department), Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Think tanks like China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (Ministry of State Security), China Institute of International Studies (Foreign Ministry) and others.
Apart from the above domestic and external propaganda arms, the other modes through which China exerts Foreign Propaganda is by opening Confucius Institutes around the world. These institutes work with foreign universities in liaison with local Chinese embassy offering no strings attached courses and huge funding from CPD via Ministry of Education in China. These institutes provide courses for promoting Chinese culture, arts, language etc along with small riders like these universities will talk a loud about one china policy while refraining from raising controversial issues like Tibet or Taiwan or Democracy and human rights inside China.
External propaganda work on four principal objectives: (1) to tell China’s story to the world, publicize Chinese government policies and perspectives, and promote Chinese culture abroad; (2) to counter what is perceived to be hostile foreign propaganda (such as the so-called “China threat theory”); (3) countering Taiwan independence proclivities and promoting unification; and (4) propagating China’s foreign policy. Along with these primary goals, the other guidelines of the propaganda arms of Chinese Communist Party are not to talk bad news during holiday periods or sensitive dates like Tiananmen massacre or Democracy movement in Hong Kong, Don’t mention problems which cant be solved easily like news of SARS epidemic was quelled in 1998, Talk up the economy and do not promote enemy’s views while moulding international opinion on China.
The CCP’s influence operations are not limited to media. Its United Front Work Department (UFWD) plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions abroad. Originally created in the 1920s to manage political alliances, the UFWD today serves as the Party’s outreach organ to overseas Chinese communities, foreign think tanks, universities, NGOs, and even political parties. It sponsors exchange programs, arranges high-level visits, and funds Confucius Institutes ostensibly cultural institutions that often carry political strings. In democratic countries, the UFWD quietly nurtures pro-China voices, funds student associations, and cultivates “useful idiots” who will parrot Beijing’s line in the name of peace, cooperation, or economic partnership. In countries like Australia, the UFWD’s work has triggered investigations by security agencies like ASIO. It has been found to be involved in funding civil society groups, sponsoring research favorable to Chinese policy, and even meddling in election campaigns. What appears to be cultural diplomacy is, in reality, soft colonization of the mind.
The Doklam Standoff: China's Information Blitz Against India
In mid-2017, the world watched as India and China stood eyeball-to-eyeball in a military standoff over a remote plateau in Doklam, near the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction. The conflict was ostensibly territorial, but beneath the surface, a different war was unfolding one for the mind. China’s state-run media unleashed an unprecedented barrage of provocative editorials, aggressive headlines, and psychological intimidation. Leading the charge was Global Times, the hawkish tabloid affiliated with the People’s Daily, which itself operates as the central mouthpiece of the CCP. Articles accused India of invading Chinese territory, warned of military escalation, and attempted to sow doubt within Indian civil society. Even Indian Foreign Minister Late Smt. Sushma Swaraj was personally attacked in bold editorial print. All of this formed a deliberate attempt to control the narrative, both domestically and globally.
What was clear to observers was that the propaganda was not improvised. It was strategic, well-resourced, and centrally orchestrated. While the Global Times played the "bad cop" with overt threats and mockery, the People’s Daily maintained a more measured tone, reiterating China’s sovereignty and historical claims. This duality in tone shrill vs. sober is a hallmark of China’s propaganda strategy, allowing for both mass mobilization and diplomatic deniability. The objective was threefold: dominate international opinion, coerce Indian policymakers, and reassure China’s domestic audience ahead of the 2017 CCP Congress where President Xi Jinping was consolidating unprecedented power.
Chinese Propaganda Warfare in Eastern Ladakh sector with India
Following the Doklam standoff in 2017, the psychological warfare front between India and China escalated further during the Eastern Ladakh crisis in 2020. This high-altitude military confrontation, sparked by Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, and other strategic points, was not just about territorial control. It became a test of information dominance and psychological resilience. China’s well-oiled propaganda machinery went into overdrive, unleashing a wave of disinformation and psychological pressure designed to frame India as the aggressor and portray the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a restrained force defending its sovereignty. Chinese media outlets, especially the Global Times, churned out aggressive op-eds, war simulations, and editorials accusing India of violating border agreements. Simultaneously, social media was flooded with visual propaganda, including edited videos and fabricated maps, claiming PLA superiority and significant Indian losses. The psychological component of this campaign was aimed at several audiences: to demoralize Indian citizens, to reassure the Chinese public, and to shape international opinion in Beijing’s favor.
Beijing’s strategy blended traditional state propaganda with newer digital methods, relying on coordinated bot accounts, seeded hashtags, and platform algorithms to spread its message. China’s information warfare teams used platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and even lingering Chinese apps in India to distribute highly produced content. These included drone footage of PLA exercises, infographics asserting Chinese territorial rights, and inflammatory commentary targeting Indian leadership. Alongside these, Chinese troll networks amplified domestic Indian voices critical of government policy or military decisions, in an attempt to widen internal fractures within India. The goal was not just international perception management but internal psychological destabilization.
India, however, responded with a sophisticated and multi-pronged counter. The government took a deliberate approach, avoiding emotional rhetoric and instead choosing strategic silence, calibrated public statements, and a strong diplomatic line. The Ministry of External Affairs, Army officials, and National Security Council coordinated messages that emphasized India’s sovereign rights while exposing Chinese duplicity using satellite imagery and troop deployment data. This helped counteract Chinese disinformation with credibility and facts. Simultaneously, India’s independent media, military veterans, and think tanks played a pivotal role in dismantling Chinese narratives, presenting clear-eyed analysis of ground realities and highlighting China's failure to achieve a decisive psychological breakthrough.
One of the boldest moves was India’s digital strike banning over 250 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and others suspected of siphoning user data and promoting subtle Chinese influence operations. This digital decoupling was as much a psychological response as a security one, signaling to Beijing that cognitive warfare would be matched with hard national resolve. The Indian military too responded visually and tactically. High-definition videos of Indian troop movements, deployments of artillery, and the arrival of Rafale jets were released in the public domain, showcasing military preparedness and national strength. These images served to reassure the domestic population and project resolve externally. The battle was not just for land, but for perception. And India, despite facing an adversary with a formidable propaganda infrastructure, refused to yield.
Over time, India’s calm and fact-based approach shifted the global narrative. Key democratic allies like the United States, Australia, and France issued statements condemning Chinese aggression. The Quad alliance grew stronger, and India’s strategic weight in Asia increased. Domestically, rather than provoking panic, the government’s handling of the situation inspired public confidence. The trauma of 1962 was decisively rejected. Unlike the past, India’s psychological posture was one of assertion, not appeasement. China’s information war was met not with louder propaganda but with resilience, clarity, and digital sovereignty.
The Eastern Ladakh crisis marks a new chapter in India’s statecraft where information warfare was met with coherent strategy, restraint, and digital recalibration. It showcased India’s growing capability to defend not only its borders but its mindspace. China’s attempt at cognitive and psychological coercion failed to fracture Indian resolve. Instead, it led to the strengthening of national unity, greater digital awareness, and a strategic shift in global alignment. As future standoffs loom on the horizon, India’s response in Ladakh serves as a powerful reminder that psychological warfare, when understood and countered wisely, can be neutralized without firing a single shot.
Most importantly, the Indian public showed remarkable resolve in not being cowed by China’s psychological warfare. In the years that followed, especially during the 2020-2024 Ladakh standoff, India consistently signaled that while it welcomes diplomacy, it would not trade sovereignty for peace. The failure of China’s psychological operations in India serves as a case study for democracies that open societies, when informed and aware, are far more resilient to Psy-War than authoritarian regimes expect. Ultimately China was forced to retreat and revert back to status quo in Eastern Ladakh in 2024, four years after the standoff began. It’s a lesson for democracies across the world that Communist China respect strength and not timidity. You stand your ground firm and look into the eye of the dragon and it will ultimately blink.
Propaganda on Steroids: The TikTok Psy-War Against the United States
We have read above the Chinese propaganda machine is highly organized and potent one especially when it is combined with Social Media and Cyber Space in 21st Century Digital Space. The Chinese propaganda dissemination has not even left US untouched by way of organizing ‘Festival of China’ at Kennedy Center in Washington DC in September 2005. Similarly China also broadcasted propaganda video on South China Sea at Times Square, New York. We have already analyzed the Chinese penetration of US in our book “The New Global Order”(2016). Recently a Chinese billionaire turned dissident Guo Wengui being part of MSS (Chinese Intelligence & PLA) revealed that China has 20,000 spies operating in United States, some of them recruited locally to work for China in US.
In the aftermath of Trump’s second presidency and the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war in 2025, China launched a new front in its psychological operations the digital battlefield of social media, with TikTok as its most potent weapon. While banned in India and under heavy scrutiny in the U.S., TikTok remained one of the most widely used platforms among American youth. In the weeks following the imposition of sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports, analysts noted an uptick in emotionally manipulative, divisive, and ideologically charged content being circulated via TikTok’s For You feed.
Videos undermining American institutions, questioning the value of democracy, mocking political leaders, and promoting “alternative” views on race, gender, and foreign policy surged in virality. Researchers uncovered that many of these videos were either directly promoted through TikTok’s opaque algorithm or seeded by shell accounts linked to China-based content farms. The goal was not to win hearts to the Chinese cause it was to fragment American society, sow confusion, weaken public trust in U.S. government institutions, and create a state of paralysis. This new form of Psy-War didn’t require missiles or manifestos only short-form videos, music tracks, memes, and emotional storytelling. This campaign revealed a chilling truth: China’s external propaganda strategy has fully entered the post-truth era. It no longer seeks to argue or persuade. Instead, it aims to disorient, distract, and destabilize.
Countering the Dragon’s Mind Games: Democratic Responses to China’s Psychological Warfare
The first and most effective defense against psychological warfare is awareness not just among intelligence agencies and policymakers, but across civil society. Both India and the United States must recognize that China’s Psy-War isn’t simply propaganda it is a systematic effort to distort reality, manipulate narratives, and undermine democratic cohesion. Therefore, countering it requires a whole-of-society approach that strengthens the internal coherence of democratic states and inoculates citizens against disinformation.
In India, this means building robust media literacy programs at the school and college level, encouraging citizens to question sources, understand algorithms, and verify claims before spreading them. Given India's linguistic and regional diversity, it is also essential to ensure that counter-propaganda and factual information are disseminated in local languages through radio, television, and social media to reach the widest audience. A decentralized but coordinated strategy that engages state governments, civil society, and even religious and cultural leaders is crucial to building resilience at the grassroots level.
For the United States, the priority lies in regulating digital platforms like TikTok, which remain vulnerable to covert manipulation by foreign adversaries. While bans may be a last resort, transparency in algorithms, content moderation practices, and ownership structures must be mandated. Washington should also partner with Silicon Valley to develop AI-based tools that can flag coordinated disinformation campaigns originating from state-sponsored actors. A bipartisan consensus on digital sovereignty is essential not just to curb Chinese influence but to preserve the integrity of American democracy.
Both India and the U.S. must also invest in proactive narrative-building. China has mastered the art of storytelling “telling China’s story well” is a directive from Xi Jinping himself. Democracies must tell their own stories better: stories of pluralism, rule of law, freedom of thought, and innovation. International broadcasting platforms like Voice of America, All India Radio World Service, and public diplomacy efforts through cultural missions and diasporic outreach must be revived and empowered with cutting-edge content and digital reach. At the diplomatic level, the Quad alliance involving India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia offers an excellent platform for coordinating information defense. A joint task force on information integrity can be created, which shares data on disinformation trends, conducts coordinated public awareness campaigns, and supports fact-checking networks globally.
Finally, democracies must adopt a posture of strategic transparency. Unlike authoritarian regimes, where secrecy breeds manipulation, democratic states can gain credibility by being open about their challenges and responses. By acknowledging attempts at psychological subversion and countering them with openness, accountability, and legal recourse, India and the U.S. can flip the script on China exposing its tactics and undermining their impact. Psychological warfare thrives in shadows. The best antidote is light of truth, of reason, and of democratic unity.
Conclusion: The Long Duel for the Mind
The battle for territory may be measured in kilometers, but the battle for the mind is measured in perception, ideology, and trust. China’s psychological warfare strategy from the Doklam plateau to Times Square, from editorial headlines to TikTok algorithms is a long-term campaign aimed at redefining truth and reshaping global narratives in its favor. As democracies confront this challenge, the answer lies not in censorship but in awareness, education, and digital literacy. It lies in strengthening civil society, protecting journalistic integrity, and promoting authentic pluralism. China’s propaganda machine may be powerful, but it is not omnipotent. Its greatest weakness lies in its need for control a rigidity that democratic resilience can outlast. The Psy-War has only begun. The side that understands minds, not just markets or missiles, will shape the century to come.
Notes:
Global Times Editorials during Doklam (2017) – Multiple articles including “India should be taught rules” (Global Times, July–August 2017)
Central Propaganda Department control metrics – Refer to China Statistical Yearbook 2004, Sections on media and communications, published by National Bureau of Statistics of China
Jiang Zemin’s Dual Doctrine “Liang Shou Zhua” – Refer to The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era by Liu Mingfu (2015 English edition)
Confucius Institutes and Foreign Policy Influence – Soft Power and China's Confucius Institutes by Falk Hartig (Routledge, 2015)
China’s United Front Work Department – See Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World by Clive Hamilton & Mareike Ohlberg (2020)
TikTok Psy-War and AI manipulation – Refer to reports by Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI): “TikTok and WeChat: Curating and Controlling Global Information Flows” (2020)
U.S. Department of State Reports on China’s Influence Operations – Global Engagement Center Report: China’s Global Media Influence 2022, U.S. State Department
ASIO investigations into Chinese influence in Australia – Annual Report 2019–2020, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
China’s Intelligence Networks in United States Include 25,000 Spies - https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-spy-network-united-states-includes-25000-intelligence-officers/
China Airs Propaganda Video Over New York's Times Square - https://www.voanews.com/a/china-airs-propaganda-video-over-new-york-times-square/3454457.html
Inside the Global Times, China’s hawkish, belligerent state tabloid - https://qz.com/745577/inside-the-global-times-chinas-hawkish-belligerent-state-tabloid
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